EDITORIAL NOTES.
By W. D. L.

THE STANDING OF THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION BEFORE THE FED.ERAL COURTS.

The Interstate Commerce Commission has made its
annual report to Congress. This report, besides reviewing
the labors of the Commission for the past year, discusses
their own important decisions and the decisions of the
The most
Federal courts affecting the Commission.
important decisions reviewed are those of the Federal courts,
which define the way in which the Courts will hereafter
regard the rates fixed by the Commissicn. This whole matter
is in a very unsatisfactory condition. There is a rapidly
growing antagonism between the Courts and the Commission, arising out of the refusal of the Court to enforce
the orders of the Commission. At least two cases' in the
Circuit Court have decided that the order of the Commission, when it sought to have the' order enforced
in the Circuit Court, was little more than advice to the
Court from a body supposed to be skilled in questions of
railroad rates, and that the Court would enforce the order
or not only after going into the whole case. Thus, in Kentucky and Indiana Bridge case, 2 the Court appointed a
master to investigate the merits, and it is asserted in the
opinion that the master went into the case much more
elaborately than the Commission. We doubt, however,
whether lie was so well qualified to judge the "facts."
But that the Courts, in the present state of the law,
have the right, should they see fit, to go into the merits
of the whole question, de iovo, when asked to enforce the
I Kentucky Bridge Co. v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 37 Fed. Rep., 567; Int.
Corn. Con. v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co.; see article on "Interstate Conmerce Commission Before Federal Courts," by Crawford Hening, in 3t
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order of the Commission, would, even without these express
decisions, be too clear for argument.
The Act says: "And the said Court shall proceed
to do justice in the premises; and to this end shall have
power to direct and prosecute in such mode and by such
persons as they may appoint all such inquiries as the Court
may think needful to enable it to form a just judgment in
the matter of such petition; and on such hearing the report
of said Commission shall be rhna facie evidence of tme
matters and things therein stated." ' That the Court meant
the judges to go behind the facts as reported by the Commission only when they had reason to entertain a doubt of
their accuracy may be admitted. But it is certain, from
the language of the Act, that the circuit judges were to be
governed in the extent of their inquiries into the matter
of the Commission's report by their own opinion as to what
would aid them in arriving at ajust/judgment.
The practical working out of this theory of the Interstate Commerce Act is far frbm satisfactory. As the
defendants feel that the hearing before the Commission is
nothing more than a preliminary skirmish, they fail to pay
much attention to the proceedings, relying on their ability
to. marshal their evidence before the Court. The Commission is placed in a more or less ridiculous light, and the

Court, by appointing "masters" to investigate facts already
found by the Commission, throw away the possibility of the
good which was expected to follow from having disputed questions of the proper railroad rates investigated by
a trained body of experts. Besides all this, the delay incident on a dual hearing of the "facts," often involving long
and complicated investigations, makes the decision of the
Court come so late as to be practically useless, or unsuited
to the changed state of facts.
There are two classes of changes which can be made
looking toward am improvement in the usefulness of the
Commission. In the first place the Commission can be
made a court whose decisions would be final, with appeals
IStats. at
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to the Supreme Court of the United States in a limited
number of cases. This would end, forever, any question of
their dependence on the circuit courts; As we consider
there is one almost insuperable objection to making the
Commission a Court, which objection we will consider
further on,' let us see what can be done to increase the
Commission's efficiency without making it a court.
There are four possible things which Congress can do
with the report of a Commission, and still have it fairly
argued, though in one case we believe wrongly, that the
Commission is still a commission and not a court. In the
first place Congress can do as they have done:
I. Make the Retiort of the Commission Prima Facie
Evidence only of the Facts Fou*nd.-In this case the Commission is certainly not a court. A court is a body which conclusively, except on appeal in the same proceedings to a
higher tribunal, applies the law to particular facts. We
say conclusively; that is, no other court of the sovereignty
can q-qestion its application of the law when either or both
of the parties in a case presenting the same (not similar)
facts comes before them.
IL Have the Orderof the Commnission Conclusive as to
the Justnessof the Rate ChargedAccording to the True Intent
and Meaning of Congress.-This, we believe, would be
making the Commission a court pure and simple. They
would find the facts-one of the duties of a court-and apply
the law to those facts. That is, they would interpret what
Congress meant by a "reasonable and just" charge under
the facts before them. This way, then, could not be adopted
without changing the character of the Commission. 2
Infra, 270.
2

It is interesting here to note the opinion of Judge JACKSON.

He

says, in the Kentucky and Indiana Bridge Case, 37 Fed. Rep., 316,
"1. . . this Court is not the mere executioner of the Commission's
order or recommendation, so as to impose upfon the Court a non-judicial
power." That Congress cannot require of judges non-judicial functions
goes withotit saying: Hayburn's Case, 2 Dal., 4o9. But we do not perceive
why courts which daily carry out the decisions of courts in other States,
or decide cases in which orders of executive officers have an important
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III. Have Congress Declare that the Rate Ordered by
the Commission was the Legal Rate.-This would be in
effect saying that the words "just and reasonable " in § i
of the Act meant nothing, and that the rate to be established by the Commission was the rate.
Two objections to this instantly occur. In the first
place, it may be an unwarranted delegation of the legislative
power. How far Congress can delegate legislative power is a
mooted question. Under any circumstances, we can at least
say that Congress can only delegate the power of legislation
over those subjects local in their nature, as the power of
local legislation for the District of Columbia or the Territories. Whether they can do this may be doubted. At
any rate there can be no further delegation. Interstate
commerce is not local in its nature. True, the particular
rates betveen A and B depend, in part, on the knowledge
of local facts. But they are not solely dependent upon such
facts. The rate of transportation all over the country must
also be taken inta consideration. The particular rate can
only be fixed with a knowledge of local conditions in the
light of the general facts of the conditions of transportation.
The second objection is also fatal to the adoption of
this plan. Congress can fix no rate of charge, either
directly or through the Commission, which would be so low
as to deprive the owners of their property without compensation. This, we believe, would be the opinion of the
majority of the Supreme Court. It is certain to be the
opinion of some of the members.'
There remains, therefore, but one other way in which
we can suppose Congress to increase the value of the Coinbearing, should not "apply the law" to the case of a carrier who had disobeyed the order of a Commission whose findings, they being a Court,
were conclusive as to the law. In other words, we do not see why the application of law to carriers should not be divided between two courts-one
to apply the law to determining the proper rate, and the other determining what should be done in case a carrier disobeyed the legal rate.
I See article "Can Prices be Regulated by Law," and cases there
cited; page 9, January number AMERICAN LAW REGISTER AND REvIEw
(1893).
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mission's report before the Courts without making the Com-

mission a court.
IV. Have the Refiort of the Commission, on the Facts of
the Case Conclusive Evidence of those Facts, Leaving the
Court Vary the Refiort of the Commission iii resfect of
Orders made and Rates of Fare or Freight Fixed, if such
Rates are not Reasonable Rates on the Facts Refior/ed.
First: Would this plan impose upon the judges of the
Circuit Courts other than judicial duties? Second: Would
it make the Commission a Court?
To answer these questions, let us put the case which at
first glance would seem to show that the judges of the-Circuit
Court would act merely as executive officers if the facts reported by the Commission were the only "facts" in the case
of which the Court could fake cognizance. Suppose the order
of the Court was attacked collaterally. As, for instance, that
the defendant should apply for an injunction to restrain the
officers of the Court from selling his property to pay the
fine for not obeying the order of the Court, on the ground
that the findings of the Commission being, as a matter of
fact, erroneous, the order of the Court deprived him of his
property without compensation. Or suppose this question
to have been raised before the Court before their order was
made establishing the rate. The Court would either have
to satisfy themselves as to the coriectness of the findings of
the Commission, which, by law, they were forbidden to do,
or accept the report as to facts as conclusive. This would
be giving to the a6ts of the Commission full faith and
credit. . It would be treating the Commission, in so far, as a
court is treated. But it would not make the Commission a
court. The Commission, in makink the order, apply law to
facts. Here again, in so far as they act, they act as a court
acts. The test of whether they really are a court is whether
the courts of the States and United States are bound by
their application of the law to the facts when the same case
between the same parties comes before them in the enforcing of the order, or when the particular decision is attacked
collaterally. To have a court, one must have a decision
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valid to all the other courts of the sovereignty, except it be on
an appeal to a higher tribunal. Should Congress make the
findings of fact of the Commission conclusive, it would
simply be forcing the court to do what it was probably
intended they would do of their own motion, say to a
carrier who refused to carry out the mandate of the Commission, and complained of the Commission's findings of
fact: "You had your day to set forth your facts. The
Commission have looked into all the evidence, and reported
the existence of this and that. We will take the existence
of this and that to be as the Commission report them." It
would simply be making the Commission permanent
"masters" of the Court to examine and report on a particular class of questions.
The Court being the final arbiter on the rate, there
would be no question as to whether the carrier by the
rate has been deprived of his property without ompensation. That question will be conclusively presumed, if the
decision is attacked collaterally, to have been raised and
decided in the negative. It would make the persons who
decided the law different from those who investigated the
facts, which is always an advantage. If the judges did not
feel that enough facts had been reported to enable them to
reach a just conclusion they should have the power to
return the case to the Commission, with the direction to
extend their investigations. It would overcome the great
danger which confronts us if we make the Commission a
Court, and appoint its judges for life, making- its decisions
conclusive; namely, that the rights of property which
owners of railroads have should be sacrificed to supposed
public expediency. If a judge tries and condemns criminals
year by year he begins to think all the world criminal. This
is one of the important reasons, it seems to us, for jury trials.
So, if a railroad commission does nothing else but cut down
exorbitant charges of railroads they will begin to think
that all railroad charges are too high and should be cut
down. In other words, they will become prejudiced against
a party whose like often offends, and who would not be in
19

